Nozick, R.

I thought this reading was quite confusing, and didn't really get the point, but below is my understanding of it. which may be hilariously wrong; so, read for the laughs, if you will.

Nozick postulates that in a state of nature, organisations 'selling' 'protection' would spring up, and function as a pseudo-state. Individuals would form collectives and eventually entrepreneurs would form companies that sold different levels of protection (from other groups and individuals) like one sells different kinds of insurance today. the organisations would relate to their members and each other in the way states do now with their citizens and other nations.

Nozick presents this as an alternative to social contract theory (i think), in that it's a kind of... natural amalgamation of individuals, organising them in mutually beneficial ways, but without the usual social contract, as people are free to move in and out, and between, different organisations.

Nozick carries this theory on through the reading, but i don't see why this is the most logical way that, in the state of nature, things would or should be organised. it seems an arbitrary hypothetical, and it doesn't really prove anything.

Why this method of organisation? and why the commodification of security? they could have formed voluntary anarcho-syndicate groups, or... lots of things!

but then again, i don't think that's actually the point. the point has something to do with the state violating the rights and freedoms of individuals. if that IS the point, then why is there all this talk about protective organisations?

any help, anyone?

feminists and difference

The Jake and Amy scenario really interested me, so i looked it up, and here are some interesting links:

http://www.holysmoke.org/fem/fem0258.htm
http://www.haverford.edu/psych/ddavis/p109g/gilligan.jake-amy.html

reading what the kids said is a bit strange, i didn't think eleven year olds had such strong moral reasoning skills.

but, the point of the whole thing is that men and women think differently when it comes to morality and justice (obviously a massive generalisation). do you think this should be something we incorporate into our political structures? and if we do, how would we do it?

i don't know enough about difference feminism to know whether or not it's more right that other kinds of feminism, but regardless, i don't think it's something you could incorporate into a liberal democratic society. because in that kind society, on a fundamental level, everyone is equal. what's different is incidental. if you assert that men and women are fundamentally different, what stops others from asserting black people and white people are fundamentally different? and i don't think many of us would agree with the latter, though a surprising amount of people i know are willing to entertain the former.

on the other hand, maybe that's not what difference feminists are saying. maybe they're saying we're all fundamentally the same, but men and women have different propensities and talents. in which case, we face the danger of stereotyping and circumscribing what is desirable and conventional. which really, just seems like what we had pre-feminism.

difference feminism doesnt really seem like feminism to me, but that's only if i think about it too long. maybe if we acknowledged women are caring, but then acknowledged they had a right to exercise that tendency to nurture in a wide variety of professions? but some professions are inherently un-nurturing (lumberjacks, lawyers (joking... or am i?)). does that mean women who want to be lumberjacks and lawyers arent woman-like?

anyway, i don't think a system based on differences could be just in the sense that we understand justice in the liberal democratic context. what do y'all think (pls to tell me if you think i made no sense)?

something i don't understand about Rawls' theory

so, your natural talents and gifts, or lack of, are natural accident, and you dont deserve them.

if you don't deserve your natural gifts, why do other people deserve the work you do using those gifts?

it seems as though, by Rawls' logic, some people win rights and stakes in other people's work and profits not because it's just, but by virtue of their (accidental, and not at all related to the concept of 'justice', Rawls says) birth?

am i getting it completely wrong? does anyone else get where i'm coming from?

also, is it not just to expect fair rewards for your work? Rawls' system seems to create disincentives for the able to use their abilities. if they know that things like special affirmative action could get in their way, those who could be talented potential employees could get bumped down the list because there's a 'disadvantaged quota' to fill.

i think merit matters. but then again, i agree with Rawls that opportunities should be truly equal, not just rhetorically so. but it's problematic!